We consider a preemption game with two potential competitors who come into play at some random secret times. The presence of a competitor is revealed to a player only when the former moves, which terminates the game. We show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria give rise to the same distribution of players' moving times. Moreover, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which each player's behavior from any time on is independent of the date at which she came into play. We find that competitive pressure is nonmonotonic over time, and that private information tends to alleviate rent dissipation. Our results have a natural interpretation in terms of eroding reputations.
Introduction
Timing is a key feature of many economic decisions, like the adoption of a technology, the marketing of a product, or the patenting of an invention. It is also an important dimension of many decisions that are less directly of an economic nature, such as, for instance, the decision by an academic when to publicize new results or theories. As these examples suggest, timing is particularly important when innovations are at stake. Indeed, in many cases, the success of a new idea or of a new product does not only depend on their intrinsic features, or on how much effort has been put into their design, but also on exogenous factors, like their complementarity or substitutability with existing ideas or products, the quality of infrastructures, the maturity of a market, or the development of institutions. Because these factors evolve over time in a way that is largely beyond the control of innovators, the latter must be careful about the timing of their decisions.
Timing decisions are also complex because they are very often made under competitive pressure, in environments in which there is little or no value in being a follower. For instance, the discoverer of a new production process must not only care about how well his invention fits the current technological and economic context, but also about the presence of competitors who may preempt him by developing and patenting a similar process, and thus deprive him of the fruit of his efforts. In that respect, a peculiarity of competitive innovation is that it is often difficult for the parties involved to actually identify their competitors, precisely because innovators have a strong incentive to keep their inventions secret in order to let them mature optimally. Take the example of an academic who wakes up one morning with a promising idea. After some bibliographical search, he realizes that nobody has written on this topic yet. Alas, as we all too well know, this does not mean that nobody is currently working on it. Indeed, somebody else may already have had a similar idea, and may be waiting for the optimal time to publish it; even if this is not the case, the longer our academic develops his idea, the more likely it becomes that a competitor eventually gets the same idea and finds therefore himself in a position to preempt him. This paper accordingly studies strategic timing decisions in a game where innovation opportunities randomly and secretly accrue to players over time.
To do so, we consider a simple preemption game with two potential competitors. Its distinctive feature is that each player effectively comes into play at some exogenous random time that is her private information, and whose distribution is common knowledge. In the light of the above examples, the time at which a player comes into play may be interpreted as the time at which she discovers a new idea. From that time on, she can make a move whenever she likes. Making a move may for instance consist in patenting the new idea. By construction, it is only once one of the players has moved that it becomes common knowledge that there actually was an active player in the game: indeed, when a player comes into play, she does not know whether or not the other player is already present, and, in the latter case, she does not observe when her competitor eventually comes into play. As soon as one of the players moves, the game is effectively terminated, and this player receives a payoff that depends only on the time at which she moved, while the other player receives nothing. The payoff from moving first is assumed to be positive and increasing over some range, which generates a first mover advantage, and leads to the basic tradeoff between letting the value of one's idea grow, and increasing the probability of being preempted by a competitor one did not identify. There are two sources of non-stationarity in the model: the first is that the payoff from moving first is not constant over time, while the second is that the probability that a player will come into play in the next instant conditional on not having come into play yet may increase over time.
We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. First, we prove a uniqueness result: all equilibria give rise to the same distribution for each player's moving time. When the hazard rate of the distribution of the random time at which players come into play is higher than the growth rate of the payoff from moving first, which is the case beyond some time threshold T * 2 , the unique continuation equilibrium involves for each player to move as soon as she comes into play, because the risk of being preempted is too high compared to the benefits of waiting any longer. By contrast, the equilibrium distribution of each player's moving time is such that players who come into play before time T * 2 are indifferent between moving at any point in some time interval [T * 1 , T * 2 ]. Second, we describe different ways of constructing an equilibrium over this time interval. An equilibrium in pure strategies can be easily exhibited, but it has the undesirable feature that it crucially depends on the time at which players come into play, which is a payoff irrelevant variable. We show that one can construct a unique simple equilibrium, in which, if a player that came into play at some time t has not moved yet by time t > t, then she should not behave from time t on any differently than if she had come into play at time t . A key feature of this equilibrium is that players who come into play before time T * 2 move according to mixed strategies: moving early is associated with low preemption risk but also low payoffs, while moving later is associated with higher payoffs but also higher preemption risk.
Our explicit characterization of the distribution of each player's moving time in any equilibrium, as well as of the players' strategies in the simple equilibrium, naturally lends itself to an analysis of how competitive pressure evolves over time, as well as to comparative statics analyses with respect to the distribution of the random time at which players come into play. We find that competition is fiercer near the lower bound T * 1 of the support of the distribution of equilibrium moving times; it then tends to decrease until time T * 2 , after which it increases again, reflecting that players who come into play after time T * 2 do not delay their move, unlike those who come into play before time T * 2 . In the context of patenting, this leads for instance to the novel prediction that patenting activity should be a U-shaped function of time. Overall, competition becomes less fierce whenever the distribution of the random time at which players come into play undergoes a positive shift in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property. In particular, this reduces the extent to which first mover rents are dissipated in equilibrium.
Finally, one can interpret our results in terms of reputation. The basic idea is that, over
, it is worthwhile for each player to make her competitor believe that she has not come into play yet: this induces her competitor to delay one's move, which allows her to reap potentially higher payoffs. Yet, an interesting feature of our model is that reputations tend to erode: as time elapses, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain a reputation of not having come into play yet.
Related Literature Our paper is rooted in the literature on the strategic adoption of a new technology, and especially that dealing with first mover advantages.
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In the case where firms can commit to adoption times, Reinganum (1981) shows that the equilibrium exhibits diffusion, and that the firm that adopts first enjoys a higher profit than its rival. By contrast, in the polar case where firms cannot commit to adoption times, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) show that there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which no first mover advantage can be sustained, and payoffs are equalized across firms.
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An interpretation of our results is that they bridge the gap between the Reinganum's (1981) precommitment model and Fudenberg and Tirole's (1985) no commitment model. Indeed, if the rate at which players come into play is low, then, conditional on coming into play, each player behaves much like the first mover in Reinganum (1981) , because she believes that it is very unlikely that she will actually face competition. By contrast, if the rate at which players come into play grows without bound, then each player believes that it is very likely that she has a competitor from the onset, so that the threat of preemption is high, which leads to Fudenberg and Tirole's (1985) full rent dissipation result in the limit.
These seminal contributions have been extended in several directions. Riordan (1992) shows that price and entry regulation may make preemption strategies less attractive, and slow down the pace of technology adoption. Dutta, Lach, and Rustichini (1995) model the strategic behavior of firms in the development phase of R&D when firms choose the quality of the good they produce; they show that there are two types of equilibria: a preemption equilibrium, and a maturation equilibrium that induces staggered innovations. Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005) extend the model of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) by introducing the possibility for firms to have access to a better technology in case of late adoption. As a result, the leader's payoff need not be hump-shaped, and may therefore exhibit several local maxima. They provide conditions under which there exists a unique equilibrium outcome, in which there is either rent equalization or a second mover advantage. Finally, Argenziano Our model is closely related to Hendricks (1992) . In his setup, firms compete for the adoption of a new technology, but may differ in their innovative capabilities: a firm may be an innovator, and thus be unconstrained in the time at which it adopts the new technology, or an imitator, and then be constrained to act as a follower. Each firm is uncertain about the innovative capability of its rival. Hendricks (1992) constructs a reputational equilibrium in which each firm delays adoption in order to convince its rival that it is an imitator. He shows that this mechanism alleviates rent dissipation compared to Fudenberg and Tirole's (1985) complete information model. In contrast with Hendricks (1992) , a distinctive feature of our model is that players' types are not fixed at time 0; rather, players may come into play continuously over time, as new ideas accrue to them. Reputations are then more difficult to maintain, and tend to erode over time.
Hopenhayn and Squintani (2008) study a preemption game with private information in which players' information stochastically evolves over time. This may for instance capture the fact that R&D competitors may improve their innovations over time, while keeping breakthroughs secret until patenting their innovations. Hopenhayn and Squintani (2008) construct an equilibrium in which each player terminates the game as soon as her private state crosses a time decreasing threshold which is characterized as the solution to an ordinary differential equation. They also find that durations are longer than when information is public, but possibly shorter than in the collusive outcome. Our model is simpler in that we suppose that players can experience only one breakthrough, that corresponds to the time at which they come into play. A distinctive contribution of our analysis is that we prove the existence of a unique equilibrium distribution for each player's moving time, which we can fully characterize, and which allows us in turn to explicitly compute the hazard rate of the first moving time.
Brunnermeier and Morgan (2009) propose a theoretical and experimental investigation of clock games, in which players receive, at a random point in time, some signal about a payoff relevant state variable. Players' clocks are de-synchronized as a result of this randomness.
When there is a tradeoff between the gains from waiting and the fear of being preempted, a player's timing decision crucially depends on her predicting the other players' clock times.
Because of the stationarity that is built in their model, Brunnermeier and Morgan (2009) can construct equilibria where each player waits a deterministic amount of time before exiting the game. This contrasts with our model, where there is an optimal date at which all players would like to move if they were not threatened by preemption. As a result, and no matter whether the equilibrium is in pure or mixed strategies, players in our model typically do not choose to wait the same amount of time before moving.
Continuous-time timing games are known to generate modeling issues. For instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) emphasize that, even in simple examples such as the "grab the dollar" game, it is not a priori obvious how to formulate the continuous-time version of the game as a limit of its discrete-time version when the time interval between consecutive periods goes to zero.
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To overcome this difficulty, they enlarge each player's strategy space in the continuous-time game by introducing, on top of the distribution of her moving time, a function that measures the intensity with which she moves "just after" times at which this distribution jumps to 1. Heuristically, this function measures the intensity of an interval of consecutive atoms. Other authors, following Dutta and Rustichini (1993) , use ad-hoc randomization devices to rule out coordination failures. By contrast, an attractive feature of our model is that we rely on a standard definition of a strategy and that coordination failures only play a minor role in our analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. In Section 3, we characterize the distribution of each player's moving time, show how to construct an equilibrium, and draw the main economic implications of our analysis. Section 4 concludes. Actions and Payoffs Both players are risk-neutral and discount future utilities at rate r > 0. Like in standard timing games, each player i has a single opportunity to make a move. The difference is that this must occur at some time t ≥ τ i , reflecting that no player can move before being born. If player i moves first, at time t, she obtains a payoff L(t) evaluated in terms of time 0 utilities, while player j obtains a zero payoff. If players i and j move simultaneously, they each obtain a negative payoff S(t) evaluated in terms of time 0 utilities. This payoff structure is adopted mainly to simplify the exposition; 4 it arises for instance in an investment timing game where two firms contemplate investing on a market that can accommodate only one of them because Bertrand competition would otherwise drive profits to zero. Denoting by P (t) the monopoly profit flow at time t and by C(t) the cost of investing at time t, the functions L and S are given in this case by
The Model
L(t) = ∞ t e −rs P (s) ds − e −rt C(t), S(t) = − e −rt
C(t)
(1) for all t ≥ 0. More generally, we maintain the following assumption throughout the paper. In the investment timing game example, these assumptions hold for instance when the monopoly profit flow grows at a constant rate µ, with 0 < µ < r, and the investment cost is constant over time and given by C > payoff. This corresponds to the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the complete information preemption model of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) , in which a single player moves at time T 1 .
Assumption 1 The function L is twice continuously differentiable, and there are times
T 2 > T 1 > 0 such that the following holds: L(t) < 0 if t ∈ [0, T 1 ), L(t) > 0 if t ∈ (T 1 , ∞), L(t) > 0 if t ∈ [0, T 2 ), L(t) < 0 if t ∈ (T 2 , ∞), L(t) ≤ 0 if t ∈ [T 1 , T 2 ].
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By contrast, time T 2 is the time at which it would be optimal for each player to move if she believed that she were not threatened by her competitor's moving first. When the players are two firms that can invest on a market that can accommodate only one of them, like in the investment timing game example, this corresponds to the unique equilibrium outcome of the complete information precommitment model of Reinganum (1981) , in which one firm invests at time T 2 and the other firm stays out of the market.
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Information We assume that the players' dates of birth τ 1 and τ 2 are independently and identically distributed according to a continuously differentiable distribution function F with positive densityḞ over R ++ . In addition, we will maintain the following standard assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption 2
The hazard rateḞ 1−F of F is nondecreasing over R + .
The date of birth of each player is her private information, or type. In particular, when a player comes into play, she does not know whether or not the other player was already born. 5 As discussed in the Introduction, the proper formulation of this result requires an appropriate extension of the players' strategy spaces. 6 To see this, note that if firm i stays out of the market, it is optimal for firm j to invest at time T 2 . Conversely, suppose that firm j commits to invest at time T 2 . Investing at any time t > T 2 cannot a best response for firm i, as it would earn no revenue because of Bertrand competition, while incurring the investment cost C(t). Investing at time t ≤ T 2 yields firm i a profit
which is maximal for t = T 2 and equal there to −e −rT 2 C(T 2 ). Hence firm i is better off staying out of the market altogether, and the strategy profile (T 2 , ∞) is an equilibrium in precommitment strategies.
Nor does she observe when the other player comes into play when this event takes place after her own birth. The only information that accrues to each player during the course of the game is whether and when her competitor makes a move, which effectively terminates the game. As stressed in the Introduction, a distinctive feature of our model compared to most analyses of preemption games is that competition is only potential: a player never knows for sure whether she indeed has a competitor, except when it is too late and she has been preempted. Our model shares this feature with the reputation model of Hendricks (1992) .
However, unlike in his model, a driving force of our analysis is that, as time goes by, it becomes less and less likely that each player was not born yet. We will come back to this important issue in Subsection 3.3.
Finally, it should be noted that our model can be seen as a perturbation of two limit situations. To illustrate this point, suppose that F is exponential with parameter λ, so that the hazard rate of F is constant and equal to λ. Then, letting λ go to 0 leads to the precommitment model of Reinganum (1981) , because each player, if ever born, believes that it is very unlikely that she ever will have a competitor. By contrast, letting λ go to ∞ leads to the preemption model of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) , in which it is common knowledge from time 0 on that each player has a competitor.
Strategies We shall use a standard definition of a strategy in a timing game. That is, we start for each player with a distribution function over her moving time, and we roll it over using Bayes' rule. Our presentation follows Laraki, Solan, and Vieille 
The first condition is a properness condition that states that
) is a mixed plan in the subgame that starts at date t. The second condition is a consistency condition that states 7 Observe that by including ∞ in the support of the distribution, we allow player i never to move. A mixed plan corresponds to what is called a strategy in the timing game literature (see for instance Owen (1968, Chapter IV, Section 5), or Pitchik (1981) ). However, this approach does not allow one to specify how players behave in all possible subgames, that is, in the present case, at any time where none of them has moved yet. This is why it is more suitable to define a strategy as a collection of mixed plans, one for each subgame.
that, as long as a plan does not require player i to act with probability 1, the continuation plans can be computed by Bayes' rule. We will write
) in order to simplify notation. Finally, we shall assume that for any Borel set A ⊂ R + , the mapping
a well defined transition function. This in turn allows one to compute quantities such as
Simple Equilibria We shall be particularly concerned in characterizing simple perfect Bayesian equilibria of our timing game that have the property that, for each player i, the
are, whenever possible, derived using Bayes' rule from the strategy (G i t (· ; 0)) t≥0 that player i adopts when born at time 0, and therefore ultimately from the mixed plan
It should be noted that, in such an equilibrium,
) represents both
• the probability that type τ i of player i moves by time t ≥ τ i , and
• the probability that a typeτ , it is easy to check using (3) that 
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we first derive necessary properties that must hold true of any equilibrium.
In particular, we prove that all equilibria give rise to the same distribution for each player's moving time. We then establish that an equilibrium exists, and we show how to construct a unique simple equilibrium, which we discuss in detail. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
Necessary Conditions
In the equilibrium analysis, it will be convenient to distinguish three intervals of types. incentive to delay her move, if she believes that there is a probability 0 that she will thereby tie with player j. This is for instance the case if the following properties hold:
P1 The types τ j < T 2 move with probability 1 before time T 2 , that is: . It should be noted that these plans also describe the off-equilibrium path behavior of each player: at any time t ≥ T 2 at which no player has moved yet, it is optimal for any player who was born before time t to move at time t.
Our first result shows that the above continuation equilibrium is actually unique.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, properties P1 and P2 hold for each player.
For each t ≥ 0, let G i (t) be the unconditional probability that player i moves by time t in equilibrium and let dG 
Our next result shows that, in equilibrium, the distributions dG Lemma 2 In any equilibrium, Supp dG
As a result, the distribution functions G 
in terms of time 0 utilities. Let time T * 2 be implicitly defined bẏ
That T * 2 is uniquely defined by (6) and lies in (T 1 , T 2 ) follows from Assumptions 1 and 2. It is straightforward to check that the maximum of (5) 
2 . Equation (6) states that, at time T * 2 , the growth rate of the payoff from moving first is equal to the rate at which the other player moves, conditional on not having moved before T * 2 . Hence, the marginal benefit of delaying one's move by an infinitesimal amount of time dt,L(T * 2 ) dt, exactly compensates the corresponding expected marginal loss. That loss is in turn equal to the probability that one's competitor is born 
, these gains are offset by the probability that 8 Indeed,L L is positive and strictly decreasing over (T 1 , T 2 ), with lim t↓T1L If follows from Lemma 1 that no player born before time T 2 wants to move after that time. 
then, for some number ε > 0, no type of player j would be willing to move over the time interval (s, s + ε).
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But then Supp dG j would not contain this interval, and therefore, as s >T 1 , would not be connected, which is ruled out by Lemma 2. It follows that for each 
It follows from Lemma 4 that
2 . An important by-product of Lemma 4 is thatT 1 is lower than T * 2 .
9 Observe that ifT 1 , the lower bound of Supp dG j , were itself lower than t + ε, there would also be a contradiction with Lemma 2, since Supp dG j would then not contain the interval (t, t + ε) and therefore would not be connected. 10 Since the function G i is right-continuous, this would remain true even if dG i had an atom at s.
Early Types
In contrast to what happens over the time interval [T * 2 , ∞), immediately moving when she is born cannot be part of any player i's equilibrium strategy before time
2 ), player j, when born before time T * 2 , would then have an incentive to wait until that time before moving. This would in turn lead player i to delay slightly her move, thus destroying the conjectured equilibrium. Instead, we conjecture that, in any equilibrium, all the types born before time T * 2 are indifferent to move at any time between some time T * 1 and time T * 2 . Given the continuation equilibrium characterized in Lemma 4, it follows that the equilibrium payoff of any such type is
in terms of time 0 utilities. Time T * 1 is the lower bound of the distribution of each player's moving time common to all equilibria, so thatT 1 = T * 1 in any equilibrium. It is pinned down by the requirement that each player must be indifferent between moving at time T * 1 or at time T * 2 , and moves with probability 1 after time T * 1 . That is, given (7),
We now formally establish these conjectures. The following lemma parallels Lemma 3.
Lemma 5
In any equilibrium, the distributions dG 
Lemma 6
In any equilibrium, G
To simplify notation, we shall hereafter denote by G(t) the unconditional probability that any given player moves by time t in equilibrium. Lemmas 4 and 5 imply that this probability is uniquely determined in equilibrium:
Each player born before T * 2 is indifferent between moving at any time t ∈ [T *
Note that a special case of (10) (10) can be rewritten in differential form as follows:
Equation (11) states that, at any time t ∈ (T * 1 , T * 2 ), the marginal benefit of delaying one's move by an infinitesimal amount of time dt,L(t) dt, exactly compensates the corresponding expected marginal loss, which is equal to the probability that one's competitor will move during the time interval [t, t + dt) conditional on not having moved before t,
multiplied by the foregone benefit L(t).
Equilibrium Existence
Lemmas 4 and 6 pin down a unique candidate for the equilibrium distribution of each player's moving time. We now construct equilibrium strategies that actually generate this distribution. We first construct a non-simple pure strategy equilibrium, and then characterize the unique simple equilibrium.
A Non-Simple Equilibrium A key insight of Lemma 4 is that there exists a unique continuation equilibrium from time T * 2 on: at any time t ≥ T * 2 at which no player has moved yet, it is optimal for any player who was born before or at time t to move immediately. Therefore, since no player moves before time T * 1 , constructing an equilibrium requires only specifying the players' behavior over [T * 1 , T * 2 ]. To do so, we rely on Lemma 6, which states that each player born before time T * 2 must be indifferent between moving at any point in this time interval. The only condition to be satisfied is that the unconditional distribution of each player's moving time be consistent with the postulated equilibrium strategies; that is, it must be equal to the average of the type-dependent distributions of moving times. For each player i, these are given by the mixed plans (G
, and so one must have
for all t ∈ [T * 1 , T * 2 ]. Now, observe that F (t) > G(t) for all t < T * 2 .
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One can thus define a strictly increasing mapping σ :
11 Indeed, by (11),Ġ 
integrating yields ln(1 − G(t)) > ln(1 − F (t)) and thus F (t) > G(t) for all t ∈ (T for all t ∈ [T
, as required. One has the following result.
Proposition 1 There exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which
• each player's type τ ≤ T * 2 moves at time σ(τ ), and
• each player's type τ > T * 2 moves immediately at time τ .
The Simple Equilibrium The equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 is not simple in the sense of Section 2. Indeed, it follows from (4) and from the fact that no player ever moves before T * 1 that, in a simple equilibrium, all the types τ < T * 1 of each player should behave in exactly the same way. This is not the case in the above equilibrium, since each type τ < T * 1 moves at time σ(τ ), where σ is a strictly increasing function. In particular, this equilibrium is not Markov perfect, since players condition their behavior on a payoff irrelevant variable, namely their date of birth. 
Lemma 7 Supp dG(·
It follows from Lemma 7 that G(t; 0) < 1 for all t < T * 2 , so that, according to (4), the behavior of each type τ < T * 2 can be inferred from that of type 0 by Bayes' rule. In line with (12), the consistency condition
must hold for all t ∈ [T * 1 , T * 2 ].
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Imposing the simplicity requirement (4), we obtain that 
• each player's type τ ≥ T * 2 moves immediately at time τ .
Discussion
Coordination Failures In any equilibrium, the distribution of each player's moving time has no atom; as a result, the probability of a joint move is zero. Therefore coordination failures only play a limited role in our analysis: actually, the assumption that they are always detrimental to both players is only used in the proof that the distribution of each 
Strength of Competition
To obtain more information on how the players compete in the simple equilibrium, it is useful to determine the shape of the function G(· ; 0). One has the following results.
Corollary 1 G(· ; 0) is strictly concave over
13 Notwithstanding the appearances, (14) is not a standard integral equation: indeed, the unknown in (14) is the kernel G, while F is given. Observe that (13) already yields one particular solution to this equation. Eroding Reputations To understand how competition evolves with time, an interesting quantity to focus on is the probability that a given player is not yet born by time t given that no player has moved yet by this time. This probability is the same in any equilibrium.
Denoting it by q(t), we have the following result.
Corollary 3 For each time t ≥ 0, one has:
Since no player moves before time T * 1 in equilibrium, the probability that a given player is not born by time t ≤ T * 1 is just the unconditional probability 1 − F (t). Symmetrically, since any player moves before time T * 2 when born before time T * 2 and moves immediately when born after time T * 2 , the probability that a given player is not born by time t > T * 2
given that no player has moved by this time is 1. Over the interval (T * 1 , T * 2 ), the mapping t → q(t) continuously increases from 1 − F (T * 1 ) to 1, as is easily checked from the definition of time T * 2 .
In line with Hendricks (1992) , one can interpret q(t) as the reputation of each player at time t if she has not moved by then. In equilibrium, before time T * 2 , it is worthwhile for each player to make her opponent believe that she is not born yet: this induces her opponent to delay one's move, which potentially allows her to reap higher payoffs. By contrast, at time T * 2 , the reputation of each player is equal to 1 and thus cannot improve anymore: this is the flip side of the fact that it is no longer optimal for each player to delay one's move beyond time T * 2 , because the risk of getting preempted overcomes the remaining gains from waiting. The reputation of each player i evolves according tõ 
E[q(t) | F s ] = E[P[Player i is not yet born by time t | F t ] | F s ] = P[Player i is not yet born by time t | F s ] < P[Player i is not yet born by time
where F s and F t represent the public information at times s and t, and the strict inequality follows from the fact that there is a positive probability that a player is born between time s and time t. As a result, the reputation of each player follows a submartingale. Specifically,
where the second inequality follows from (17) , and the second from (10) and (17) again.
One can check from (18) that the expected instantaneous rate of decline of each player's reputation is equal to the hazard rate of the players' type distribution:
reflecting that the key driving force in the evolution of players' reputations is the rate at which players actually come into play. It should be observed that, since the hazard rate of F is assumed to be nondecreasing over R + , the closer one moves to time T * 2 , the faster the players' reputations tend to decline on average. Another implication of (19) is that the higher the hazard rate of the players' type distribution, the faster the players' reputations tend to decline on average.
14 Similarly, it follows from (17) 
, so that the higher the hazard rate of the players' type distribution, the slower the players' reputations conditional on none of them moving tend to grow on average.
It is useful to contrast these findings with those of Hendricks (1992) . In his model, a firm can be an innovator, or an imitator. Firms compete for the adoption of a new technology.
While an innovator has no constraint on the time at which it can adopt, an imitator cannot adopt before an innovator does. The reputation of a firm is the posterior belief that it is an imitator given that no firm has adopted yet. Observe that, in this case, the reputation of a firm follows by construction a martingale, since it is equal to the posterior probability of a fixed event: being an imitator. In our model, by contrast, reputations tend to erode: as time elapses, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain a reputation of not being born. Comparative Statics Last, we analyze how the simple equilibrium is affected by a change in the players' type distribution. Specifically, consider a family of distribution functions F θ parameterized by θ ∈ R, which satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP); that is, the mapping t →Ḟ θ 1 (t)
is nondecreasing whenever θ 1 > θ 0 . As is well known, this implies both that F θ 1 first order stochastically dominates F θ 0 , and that the hazard rate of
. A natural question is to determine the impact on the equilibrium distributions of moving times of a shift of the players' type distribution function from F θ 0 to F θ 1 . Assuming for simplicity that the mapping (θ, t) → F θ (t) is continuously differentiable, and denoting by T * 1,θ and T * 2,θ the lower and upper bounds of the support of the equilibrium mixed plan G θ (· ; 0) of type 0, given players' type distribution function F θ , one first has the following result, which actually holds in any equilibrium. and T * 2,θ go to time T 2 , and the equilibrium payoff of a player born before time T 2 goes to L(T 2 ). This corresponds to the outcome of the precommitment model of Reinganum (1981) .
By contrast, when θ goes to 0, the fear of preemption becomes extreme, both times T * 1,θ and T * 2,θ go to time T 1 , and the equilibrium payoff of a player born before time T 1 goes to 0. This corresponds to the outcome of the preemption model of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) . The distribution of the first moving time then converges weakly to a Dirac mass at time T 1 and all rents are dissipated in the limit.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigated the impact of private information in a standard preemption context. One interpretation of the game we study is that ideas randomly and secretly accrue to players over time. Once a player has an idea, she can publicize it in exchange for an immediate reward, or let it mature as a function of the overall economic environment; the second option however involves a preemption risk. We characterized the distribution of each player's moving time, and showed that there exists a unique simple equilibrium in which a player's behavior is independent of the date at which an idea occurred to her. Our model delivers richer empirical implications than standard preemption models with complete information. In particular, we found that competitive pressure is nonmonotonic over time, and that private information tends to alleviate rent dissipation. 15 One needs to be slightly cautious here since, as shown in Corollary 4, the distributions {dG θ (· ; 0)} θ∈R do not have the same supports: if θ 1 > θ 0 , the support of dG θ 1 (· ; 0) is shifted to the right compared to that of dG θ 0 (· ; 0). This does not prevent us to define likelihood ratios, however, provided infinite values are allowed. We adopt throughout the convention 0 0 = 0, which enables us to deal with non-overlapping supports.
Our analysis focused on the case where the value of an idea only depends on exogenous factors, such as the market conditions at a given date. In particular, it is independent of the time at which this idea occurred to a player; as a result, early discovery of an idea does not in itself give an edge on one's competitors, besides giving one the opportunity to publicize this idea earlier. Yet, it is easy to think of examples in which the value of an idea for a player also depends on how long she has had this idea: for instance, the value of an academic project depends on how much effort has been put into it, and hence, indirectly, on how long its bearer has entertained it. It would be interesting, in future research, to extend the analysis of this paper to take this possibility into account.
Appendix
Throughout the Appendix, we adopt the convention that all types' payoffs are evaluated in terms of time 0 utilities. Lemmas 1 to 3 deal with potential atoms in the distributions of players' moving times. Note that if there were an atom at t in the equilibrium distribution of player i's moving time, then, by virtue of the equality
there would be a positive measure of types of player i who move at t with positive probability.
Therefore moving at t should be a best response for all these types, an observation we rely 
But this supremum cannot be reached, since, as S(t) < 0, she would obtain a strictly lower 
There are then two cases to consider.
Case 1 Suppose first that max s∈[t,T
, and therefore
Then there exists ε ∈ (0, T 2 − t) such that no type of player j wants to move over [t,
Since L is strictly increasing over [t, t + ε], any type of player i who moves at time t could then strictly increase
by moving at time t + ε rather than at time t, a contradiction. 
where
. Therefore any type of player i who moves at time t could strictly increase her payoff by moving slightly before time t rather than at time t, a contradiction. The result follows.
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof goes through a sequence of steps.
Step 1 
Step 2 One next shows thatT 1 < T * 2 . Indeed, ifT 1 ≥ T * 
, than moving at timeT 1 and obtaining a payoff
. This contradiction establishes thatT 1 < T * 2 .
Step 3 
Moreover, using the fact that 1 − G j and L are nonnegative and continuous at time t, and that L is continuously differentiable at time t, one gets
is the lower right Dini derivative of (1−G j )L, and the inequality follows from the facts that G
. Therefore any type of player i who moves at time t could strictly increase her payoff by moving slightly after time t rather than at time t, a contradiction.
Hence the result.
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose first by way of contradiction that the function ( 
. Since it is nonincreasing over this interval, there must exist some 
, it follows from (7) and (8) (see for instance Walter (1998, Chapter I, Section 2)):
The general solution to the nonhomogeneous equation (27) can be found by the method of variation of parameters. Specifically, Z(t) is of the form
for some function φ. Plugging this back into (27) yieldsḞ (T * 1 )φ =Ġ −Ḟ , which, given that
, leads the general solution to (26):
for some constant K 2 yet to be determined. One can check from (6) and (9) that for H to be defined over the whole interval [T * 1 , T * 2 ), as required, one must have K 2 ≥ 0, because the denominator of (28) precisely vanishes at T * 2 whenever K 2 = 0. From (25) and (28), it therefore follows that I is of the form
for some positive constant K 1 yet to be determined. It is then straightforward to recover G(· ; 0) from (22) and (29). This yields
for all t ∈ (T * 1 , T * 2 ). The constants K 1 and K 2 are pinned down by requiring respectively that G(T * 1 ; 0) = 0, which follows from the admissibility of G(· ; 0), and that lim 2 ), one only needs to check thaẗ G ≤ 0 over this interval, which follows at once from (2) and (9) . Hence the result.
Proof of Corollary 2. Using (6), (8) and (9) along with the fact that G(t) = F (t) for all t ≥ T * 2 , it is easy to check that G is differentiable at T * 2 , witḣ
Thus, given (23), it is enough to establish that lim 
where p(t) is the probability that a given player has not yet moved by time t given that she was born before time t. Formally:
where the second equality follows from (12) . Plugging (34) into (33) and using (10) then yields the result.
Proof of Corollary 4. For each θ ∈ R, time T * 2,θ is defined by (6) given the type distribution function F θ . Since the mapping (θ, t) → F θ (t) is continuously differentiable, it follows from the implicit function theorem that the derivative 
Now, observe that 
where the second equality follows from (6) . Now, observe that 
